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The Size and Scope of the European Third Sector

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1 Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide an estimate of the size of the Third Sector in European Union member countries and Norway. The conceptual framework for defining the Third Sector has been developed by a team of European experts working under the auspices of the Third Sector Impact Project\(^1\), and outlined in Salamon and Sokolowski (2016)\(^2\).

In a nutshell, this conceptual framework defines the Third Sector as a set of organizational and individual activities that meet the following three underlying philosophical notions frequently evoked in Europe (and very likely beyond it):

i. Privateness—i.e. forms of individual or collective action that are outside the sphere and control of government;

ii. Public purpose—i.e., serving the broader community and not primarily to generating profit or otherwise creating something of value primarily to the persons undertaking the activities or those persons’ family members; and

iii. Free choice—i.e., pursued without compulsion.

More specifically, this conceptualization includes organizations characterized by the five operational features;

a) It is an organization, that is, institutionalized to some extent, though not necessarily legally registered or constituted;

b) It totally or significantly limits through some binding provision distributing any surplus generated from their activities to its directors, employees, investors, or others;

c) It is self-governing, that is, it is institutionally separate from government, is able to control its own general policies and transactions and has the capacity to own assets, incur liabilities, or engage in transactions in its own right;

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\(^1\) For more information on this project see http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/

d) It is non-compulsory, that is, involving some meaningful degree of uncoerced free choice on the part of individuals working for, or participating in, its activities; and

e) Private, i.e., not controlled by government.

The set of institutional units that embody all five operational features specified above constitutes the organizational component of the TSE sector. This includes most nonprofit institutions (NPIs), as well as certain cooperatives, mutual societies, and social enterprises.

In addition to organizations, the TSE sector embraces unpaid individual activities for social or public benefit. The five operational features identifying these activities of the household sector, drawing on the set of criteria worked out and described in the *ILO Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work* include:

a) They produce benefits for others and not just, or chiefly, for the person performing them. The test here is whether the activity could be replaced by that of a paid substitute;

b) They are not incidental to other activities. Rather, they are carried on for a meaningful period of time, typically defined as an hour in a certain reference period;

c) They are unpaid, that is, the person performing them is not entitled to any compensation in cash or kind;

d) The activity is not aimed at benefiting members of one’s household or immediate family; and

e) The activity is non-compulsory, which means it involves a meaningful element of individual choice.

This conceptual framework covers all uncompensated efforts outside of organizations of any kind that benefit general public, performed by individuals 15 years of age or older, such as helping friends or neighbors, working for the benefit of communities, human rights, or the environment, except uncompensated internship, apprenticeship, and similar training activities to obtain occupational skills.

Figure 1 summarizes the scope of organizational and individual activities covered by the conceptualization of the Third Sector adopted in this report.
Armed with this conceptualization of the Third Sector we are in a position to estimate its dimensions and contours. But which dimensions can provide the most relevant description of this sector? Conventional economic measures, such as the monetary value of the sector’s contribution to the national economy (the so-called Gross Value Added or GVA) may not be the best measure because a very substantial part of the third sector’s contribution to economy and society is provided at below market prices or free of charge and relies on unpaid volunteer labour. Likewise, the number organizations, commonly cited in popular accounts, is also misleading due to vast differences in the size of organizations. A sector with a few very large organizations carries more weight than one with many very small organizations. What is more, existing listings of organization are notoriously unreliable because they tend not to be updated and fail to purge defunct organizations in a regular way.

Previous research (Salamon et. al. 2004) has identified the following four dimensions describing the Third Sector that allow us to compare it to other segments of national economies and to its counterparts in different countries:

1) The size of the Third Sector workforce, which provides a better measure of the level of activity that this sector accounts for than does the economic value of its output. Because such entities often engage part-time workers as well as full-time ones, this variable has to be measured in full-time-equivalent terms, i.e. a person
working half-time for a Third Sector organization would be counted as one-half of a FTE worker.  

3) **The composition of the Third Sector (TS) workforce.** Unlike the business or government sectors, the Third Sector relies extensively on both volunteer and paid employment. Therefore, it is important to generate information on both forms of labour, and to be able to differentiate between the two. What is more, it is important to measure both volunteer work that is channelled through organizations and that provided directly to other individuals. **The substance of TS activities,** which can be most conveniently measured by the shares of the TS workforce in different activity fields. To facilitate comparison between TS activities and those of the other sectors, it is important to use classification structures that have been developed to portray the composition of the other sectors; and

4) **The composition of TS revenue,** which is represented by revenue streams from three major sources: government payments (including grants, contracts, and reimbursements for services rendered to eligible parties); income from market sales of goods and services and membership benefits to private parties; and philanthropic donations by private parties. Unfortunately, existing international statistical systems, such as the System of National Accounts, obscure these different revenue streams by treating government grants as transfers indistinguishable from private philanthropy and government contracts and vouchers as market sales indistinguishable from other market sales. Accordingly, great care must be taken to adjust the data to reflect clearly these three distinct sources.

Since the conceptual framework adopted in this project identifies different institutional components of the TS, we also include a fifth dimension:

5) **The institutional composition of the TS,** including at least four distinguishable components: NPIs, cooperatives and mutual societies that are not NPIs, social

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3 Since volunteers and some paid workers work part-time or episodically, we converted all employment data into full-time equivalent (FTE) workers. This was done by dividing the total hours of paid or volunteer work in a given reference year by the number of hours considered to represent “full-time work” which we assume to be on average 1,760 hours. This number varies from country to country and it is generally lower in high-income countries of Western Europe than in medium income countries of Eastern Europe.

enterprises that are not NPIs or cooperatives, and direct volunteer action outside organizations.5

In developing the measures of these five dimensions of the TS in the European Union and Norway, we utilize the following data sources:

1) A comprehensive study of nonprofit institutions in over 40 countries, including 20 European countries, carried out under the auspices of the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project (CNP)6;
2) A report on the social economy in the European Union prepared by the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC)7;
3) Nonprofit Institution Satellite Accounts and similar reports issued by the statistical agencies of Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden;
4) Time Use Surveys and other surveys in several European countries.8

5 Volunteer work carried out through organizations is also included, but its full-time equivalent amount is included in the count of NPI workers.
6 For a description of this project and its methodology see Salamon et al. 2004.
7 José Luis Monzón Campos and Rafael Chaves Ávila, THE SOCIAL ECONOMY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Brussels: European Economic and Social Committee, 2012.
It must be noted, however, that the estimates of the size and contours of the European third sector offered here are necessarily highly preliminary. This is so because the data available on the key components of this sector remain grossly incomplete and, even where available, seriously out of date. Although a special Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts was issued by the United Nations Statistical Division in 2003, only six EU countries plus Norway have seen fit to implement this Handbook. Similarly, while the Statistics Department of the International Labour Organization issued a Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work in 2011, only three countries in Europe have implemented it, leaving us dependent on time-use survey data that covers only 17 of the 28 EU countries and Norway. The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project generated solid data on nonprofit institutions in 20 of the 27 EU countries, but these data were collected mostly in the mid-1990s and have been updated for only a handful of the countries since then, making it necessary to rely on inevitably imperfect methods for “aging” the data. No systematic data exist on social enterprises and the data available on cooperatives makes it difficult to determine what share meet the in-scope criteria for inclusion in the third sector or what share are actually recorded as nonprofit institutions.

Fortunately, a revised version of the UN NPI Handbook has been developed and is available for implementation. This revision adheres closely to the definition of the third sector offered in this report and therefore offers the hope of generating more reliable data on the European third sector than is currently available. But it remains to be seen whether European statistical and policy officials will support implementation of this important new piece of statistical machinery.

While preliminary, however, the data presented here offer a solid first approximation of the scale and contours of the European third sector based on the best data available and estimating techniques available. For a detailed description of these various estimating procedures used, see Annex 1.

To present these estimates, the balance of this chapter falls into three sections. In the section that follows, we report our estimates of the aggregate dimensions of the TS in 28 EU countries and Norway. In the second section we examine regional variations in the scale and composition of the TS to the extent permitted by the data. These latter findings, in turn, pose the puzzle that the final section of this chapter will seek to unravel.

2 The Contours of the Third Sector: The Aggregate View
2.1 An enormous economic engine

Perhaps the major aggregate finding that has emerged from the data examined here is that, contrary to many popular assumptions, the European Third Sector is an enormous economic force, outdistancing most major industries in the scale of its workforce. Taken together, as of 2014, the latest data for which data are available, the European third sector engages an estimated 28.3 million full-time equivalent (FTE) workers (paid and volunteer) in the 28 EU countries and Norway. The European TS thus accounts for nearly 13 per cent of the European workforce. This is significant because any industry that accounts for 5 per cent of the employment of a country is considered to be a major industry. What is more, in the fields in which they operate, the TS units turn out to account for an even larger employment share.

Put somewhat differently, with over 28 million full-time equivalent workers, the European third sector is the third largest “employer” in Europe, trailing only trade and manufacturing, but outdistancing the construction and transportation industries by 2:1, and the financial services industry by 5:1 (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Size of the TS workforce vs. employment in major industries, 29 European countries, 2014

![Bar chart showing the size of the TS workforce vs. employment in major industries, 29 European countries, 2014]

2.1.1 Volunteer engagement

A second striking characteristic of the European third sector is its engagement of volunteers in addition to paid employees. In fact, of the over 28 million full-time
equivalent workers in the civil society sector in Europe, 55 per cent are volunteers (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Composition of TS workforce, 29 European countries, 2014

Put somewhat differently, the third sector in Europe mobilizes a volunteer workforce of over 15.5 million full-time equivalent workers, more FTE workers than are employed in any major European industry but trade and manufacturing. Of these 15.5 million FTE volunteer workers, 6.5 million work through nonprofit organizations and the balance, roughly 9.0 million volunteer workers, volunteer directly to help friends and neighbours. Clearly, this ability to mobilize a veritable army of volunteers is another potent measure of the reach and power of the third sector.

2.1.2 What does the European third sector do?
Not only are civil society organizations important in economic terms: they are also important socially, politically, and culturally. Indeed, third sector actors perform a multitude of social functions. For one thing, they are service providers, delivering significant shares of such services as health care, education, environmental protection, disaster relief, and economic development promotion. Beyond this, however, they function as policy advocates, as promoters of a sense of community, as guardians of a crucial value emphasizing the importance of individual initiative for the common good, and as vehicles for giving expression to a host of interests and values—whether religious, ethnic, social, cultural, racial, professional, or gender-related (Salamon 2014).

To gain some insight into the activities and functions that the European third sector performs, we classified the activities of the third sector workforce into three major
categories: service, expressive and other functions. The service function entails activities in education, social services, health care, and housing and community development. Direct volunteer action, which by definition involves help to other households, is considered a service activity in this report. The expressive function comprises activities in culture and recreation, membership organizations, including labour unions, business and professional organizations, environmental organizations and religious congregations. Finally, the other function includes activities of charitable foundations, international organizations as well as activities not elsewhere classified. Given the limitations of the existing data, more detailed classification of TS activity by industry is not possible at this time. As Figure 4 shows, we estimate that the overwhelming majority (75 per cent) of TS workforce activity is devoted to the service functions of the sector.

Figure 4. European TS workforce activity, by function, 29 countries, 2014

![Pie chart showing service, expressive, and other functions]

N=28.3 million FTE workers

2.1.3 Revenue structure
The revenue structure of the civil society sector differs markedly from what many observers tend to believe. While charitable giving attracts the most public and media attention, it turns out to account for a relatively small share of TS revenue. Thus, as shown in Figure 5, taken all together, charitable contributions—from individuals, foundations, and corporations—account on average for about 11 per cent of overall TS revenue in Europe. By contrast, private fee income, which includes private payments for goods and services, membership dues, and investment income, accounts for a much larger 57 per cent of income on average. Finally, government support, which includes grants, contracts, and reimbursements for services rendered to eligible private parties

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9 See Annex 1 for the methodology used in this estimation. Given the limitations of the existing data, more detailed classification of TS activity by industry is not possible at this time.
such fields as health care or education, make up the balance of about 34 per cent of TS revenue.\textsuperscript{10}

Figure 5. European TS revenue structure, 29 countries, 2014

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{European TS revenue structure, 29 countries, 2014}
\end{figure}

2.1.4 Institutional structure
The final dimension of the European TS that deserves attention is its institutional structure. This includes two components: \textbf{first}, an organizational component made up of NPIs, cooperatives and mutual societies, and social enterprises; and \textbf{second}, a direct action component made up of volunteer activities not mediated by organizations.

Due to data limitations, it is not possible to estimate the size of the social enterprises that are not NPIs. Based on the available information, however, it is reasonable to assume that most social enterprises in Europe are either NPIs or cooperatives, so the absence of data on the non-NPI social enterprise component should not alter our picture very substantially.

Similar problems relate to the cooperatives that are subject to a full non-distribution of profit constraint and thus are considered to be NPIs. Based on data available in at least one European country—France—we estimate that 9 per cent of the total recorded

\begin{itemize}
\item Private philanthropy, 8%
\item Government, 34%
\item Private fees and sales, 57%
\end{itemize}

Excluding direct volunteer action

\textsuperscript{10} These estimates do not include any payments for direct volunteer action, which if any, we assume to be insignificant. We furthermore assume that all income of cooperatives and mutual societies comes from market activities, and thus is considered to be fee income. Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to estimate the monetary values of these revenue streams at this time. For more information about this estimation methodology see Annex 1.
employment in cooperatives and mutuals reported in the one existing estimate of European cooperative employment is actually working in cooperatives that are also NPIs. We have therefore added this to our estimate of the in-scope cooperative and mutual employment outside of NPIs and adjusted the employment in NPIs accordingly. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the TS workforce among these three resulting components: direct volunteering and the two remaining institutional components, NPIs (excluding those that are cooperatives), and cooperatives and mutuals (including those that are also NPIs).

**Figure 6. Institutional structure of the European TS, 29 countries, 2014**

It is clear that NPIs still engage the majority (58 per cent) of the TS workforce, and about 88 per cent of the organizational component of the TS. Of this NPI workforce, however, 60 per cent is made up of volunteers. By contrast, cooperatives and mutual societies account for a much smaller 10 per cent of the TS workforce even after including the cooperatives operating as NPIs.

The final component of the TS sector—direct volunteer action—accounts for a significant 32 per cent of the TS workforce, and if the volunteers operating through nonprofit organizations were included, the overall volunteer share of total TS full-time equivalent employment would stand at 55 per cent.

### 2.1.5 Longitudinal changes

One final notable dimension of TSE activity has been its recent dynamism. Although we have longitudinal data only on one TSE institutional component, the nonprofit institutions (NPIs), these limited data shows the TSE sector has recently been in the midst of significant growth in a number of countries—growing at a rate that exceeds the growth of
overall employment in the economy. Thus, paid employment in the NPI sector grew at an annual average rate of 3.4 per cent in the 12 EU countries on which comparative time-series data are available (Figure 7). By comparison, as shown in Figure x, total employment in these 12 countries grew at an annual rate of only 0.6 per cent.

Figure 7. Average annual change in employment in selected countries, NPIs vs. Total economy

Moreover, NPI employment growth outdistanced total employment growth in all but one country (Denmark). A particularly dramatic difference took place in Spain, where the NPI employment was growing at the annual rate of 6.6 per cent between 2008 and 2013, while total employment shrunk by 3.5 per cent per year in the same time period.

2.1.6 A Diverse Sector: Regional Variations

Important though these aggregate features of the TS are, however, they can be misleading. As one old joke puts it: even a statistician can easily drown in a creek that is on average 5 inches deep. Behind the averages often lie some significant cross-national and regional variations. And that is certainly true of the European third sector.

To make sense of these variations, it is useful to examine them at the regional level. For this purpose, we have divided the EU countries into four regional groupings, which we term Northern Europe, Southern Europe, Scandinavia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Table 1 below depicts the breakdown of European countries among these four regional clusters. To be sure, significant variations exist within these regional groupings, and even
within particular countries, but our data do not at this stage permit us to go below the regional level.

Table 1: Regional grouping of EU countries plus Norway

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<tr>
<th>Northern Europe</th>
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<td>Austria</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<th>Southern Europe</th>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Malta</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<th>Central and Eastern Europe</th>
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<td>Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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### 2.2 Regional variations in third sector size

A useful starting point for this discussion of regional variations in the contours of the TS is with the sector’s basic scale. Countries differ, of course in the size of their population, so it is natural that larger countries will have larger TS workforces than smaller ones. To draw valid comparisons, therefore, some way must be found to control for the size of the country’s populations. We do this by focusing on the share that the TS workforce represents of the total number of people employed in each region. As Figure 8 shows,
that share varies from a high of 14.9 per cent in the Scandinavian countries to low of 9.4% in Central and Eastern Europe.\(^{11}\)

**Figure 8. European TS workforce as a per cent of total employment, by region, 2014**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of TS workforce of total employment by region.](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>TS percent of total employment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29 countries</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Eastern Europe</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
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### 2.2.1 Relative scale of different TS components among regions

These overall disparities in the relative size of the third sector among regions are overshadowed, moreover by the much larger disparities in the composition of the third sector in the different regions of this continent. What becomes clear is that the third sector is far from being the same exact phenomenon in the different parts of this continent, a point that policy-makers and students of the field must acknowledge. Thus, in Central and Eastern Europe, 70 per cent of third sector employment takes the form of direct volunteering (Figure 9). By contrast, employment in NPIs—both paid and volunteer—accounts for a much smaller 23.7 per cent. This contrasts sharply with Northern Europe, where 73 per cent of the TS employment is in NPIs, much of it in paid positions, while employment in coops accounts for under 6 per cent and direct volunteering a relatively small 21.5 per cent. This testifies to the still-embryonic nature of the more formal third sector institutions in the formerly Soviet-dominated territories and their much more robust development in the continent’s advanced Northern tier. Southern Europe is different again, with an exceptionally high 14.5 per cent of TS employment in cooperatives, a similarly quite high 33 per cent in direct volunteering, and a correspondingly low 52.5 per cent of employment in NPIs.

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\(^{11}\) See Annex 2 for the values for individual countries.
2.2.2 Regional variations in European TS functions and revenue patterns

Other dimensions of the TS—the scope of activity by field and the revenue structure—also show considerable regional differences. Due to data availability limitations, we can only examine these variations on a much smaller set of European countries and institutions—i.e. only for the NPI components of the TS and only for the 20 countries covered by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. As Figure 10 shows, the distribution of service and expressive activities of NPIs is very different in the Scandinavian countries, where 57 per cent of nonprofit FTE employment is devoted to expressive functions and only 40 per cent to service ones, than it is in Northern and Southern Europe, where these proportions are reversed, with over 60 per cent of TS effort devoted to service provision and a much smaller 31 to 35 per cent devoted to expressive functions. This reflects the much greater reliance on government for service provision in the Scandinavian lands and the long-standing tradition of nonprofit involvement in advocacy and sport activities.
Similar disparities characterize the revenue structure of NPIs across Europe as shown in Figure 11. Thus fee income is the dominant revenue source for TS entities in the Scandinavian countries, accounting for 57 percent of NPI revenue, whereas government is the dominant source in Northern Europe outside of Scandinavia, with a similar 57 percent of revenue coming from this alternative source in this region. Lacking both substantial government and fee income, NPIs in Central and Eastern Europe rely disproportionately on philanthropy, which accounts for 19 percent of NPI income, twice the share that it provides to the much larger NPI sectors in Scandinavia, and Northern Europe.
As this section has shown, behind the aggregate picture of the European third sector lie some enormous cross-regional variations. What is more, these variations apply to each of the dimensions of the TS that we have been able to examine, and often in apparently confusing ways. What has caused these variations? Is it possible that these variations hold the key to explaining what it is that determines the size, shape, functions, and financing of the TS sector across Europe? It is to this intriguing set of questions that we turn in the next section.

### 2.3 Explaining Cross-National Variations in TS Dimensions

Cross-national dimensions in different manifestations of TS activities have not, of course, totally escaped public scrutiny. Public officials, journalists, foundation officers, civil society activists and volunteers have long had hunches about different levels and manifestations of third sector activities among countries and regions, even though they have lacked solid empirical verification. Yet, the popular explanations of these differences are at best unconvincing and often misleading.

Perhaps the most popular explanation links these cross-country differences in the manifestations of TS activities to different cultural values and sentiments. The key element of this line of argument is that social institutions such as civil society organizations result from the development of certain values, attitudes, and norms of behaviour, many of which are supposedly rooted in religious convictions and teachings. Societies that espouse norms and values favourable for charity, self-governance, or altruism will have stronger nonprofit and philanthropic sectors than societies in which such impulses are weaker.

Variants of this argument can be found in the academic literature as well. For example Banfield attributed the backwardness of southern Italy to a prevalent, but dysfunctional, moral code that he termed “amoral familism” that impeded cooperation among families or clans and thus the growth of associational ties. Fukuyama proposed a similar cultural explanation of the sources of civil society, emphasizing the cultural value of “trust.” Societies exhibiting high levels of trust create self-governing associations in both business and social life, whereas low-trusting societies rely on familial ties while the management of public affairs is carried out by a centralized authority (the state). “A thriving civil society,” Fukuyama therefore explains, “depends on a people’s habits, customs, and ethics—attributes that can be shaped only indirectly through conscious political action.
and must otherwise be nourished through an increased awareness and respect for culture.\textsuperscript{12}

Another line of argument, developed by American economists and popularized by the spread of the neoliberal ideology during the past thirty years, attributes these differences to the degree of heterogeneity of demand for public goods. According to this theory, the inability of the market to supply the level of collective goods that citizens demand necessitates that such goods are paid by public funding rather than through ordinary market transactions. However, when the demand for public goods is diversified due to different preferences of different socio-demographic groups, it is difficult to obtain the level of political consensus needed to secure sufficient public funding for such goods. This set of circumstances leads to the growth of the nonprofit sector to supply the collective goods that neither the market nor the state can provide. According to this theory, the lower the level of heterogeneity in a population, the higher the level of government provision of public welfare services, and therefore the lower the level of TS development needed to provide the “collective goods” that citizens demand. In other words, the third sector should be less prominent where government spending is lowest, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{13}

Neither of these theories is very consistent with the findings reported here, however. So far as the cultural theories, Europe, and especially the European Union countries, show a remarkable degree of cultural similarity by global standards. All these countries share virtually identical cultural and religious roots – the Greco-Roman civilization and Christianity. Virtually every European country’s culture emphasizes the importance of social solidarity, altruism, helping others, civic virtues, and engagement in public affairs. Clearly, a factor that is so ubiquitous can hardly be counted on to explain the enormous variations that exist in the manifestations of the TS in Europe. Indeed, countries with very similar religious traditions, such as Italy, Ireland and Poland, all predominantly Catholic nations, have very different levels of TS activities, especially their organizational component. Portugal and Spain share not only the same religion but also the same cultural tradition, yet differ markedly in their TS manifestations.


This, of course does not mean that cultural norms, values and ideologies do not play any role in the TSE sector development, but that the relationship between the ideological influences and TSE is far more complex than the cultural sentiments theories claim. On the one hand, the norms and values can constrain even powerful social interests. At the same time, whether particular values or norms gain support or legitimacy can be influenced by their consistency with group interests. Max Weber recognized this latter point in his concept of “elective affinity,” the tendency of social actors to lean toward cultural norms and values that align with their predispositions and group interests ([1904-05] 1958, see also Howe, 1978). Thus, according to Weber, Protestant religious doctrines emerging in 15th and 16th century Europe gained ground in important part because they were more aligned with the economic interests of wealthy merchants than the traditional Catholic teaching renouncing worldly possessions.

This suggests that rather than being treated as general influences without observable causal links to particular social groupings or specific institutional outcomes, the cultural and ideological influences must be linked to power and actions of specific social actors. For example, the long-standing Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity, holding that social issues ought to be addressed by the social unit closest to the family, including, of course, the parish, provided a convenient template for conservative elements to use in resisting worker pressures for expanded state-provided social welfare protections in 19th century Germany by channelling such protections through politically “safe”, religiously affiliated, nonprofit organizations. Hence as it will be explained in more detail later in this chapter, this created a pattern of TSE development that we term “welfare partnership.”

With regard to the economic theories linking the rise of the third sector to a combination of market failure and government failure that constrains government social welfare spending, the evidence presented here roundly refutes them. Indeed, far from being more limited, the European third sector is much larger and more robust in precisely those regions—Northern Europe and Scandinavia—where government social welfare spending is higher. This refutes both these market failure/government failure theories and the common perception that Western European countries have built “welfare states.” In fact, what they have built are “welfare partnerships” in which governments have turned massively to nonprofit organizations to delivery state-funded social welfare services. This has been possible because, unlike the US, European countries have developed what Lijphart terms “consensus democracy,” which differs from the winner-take-all image embodied in the government-failure theory by making provision for proportional
representation of minority interests. This makes it possible to build consensuses among various interest groups and thereby generate support for a much broader array of public goods than the hypothesized “median voter” might want and eliminates the binary “either-or” choice between government or third sector provision by designing cooperative arrangements that engage both. This may explain why the inverse relation between government social welfare spending and the size of the civil society sector predicted by the economic theories theory turns out to be so powerfully refuted by the available cross-national data.

How then are we to account for the significant differences in TS size and contours among the different European regions? One clue to the answer to this question can be found in Robert Putnam’s influential study of the significant variations in the effectiveness of regional governments in North and South of Italy. Although Putnam notes the differences in cultural sentiments between North and South as a crucial factor, he ultimately tracks these differences to different historical development experiences shaped by different political power relations in these different regions. Although Putnam does not develop this argument further, his analysis supports a more general explanation of the developing patterns of TS development that the two authors of this chapter have termed the “social origins” theory of third sector development.

This theory links the development of the third sector to different configurations of power relations among key social actors, such as socio-economic classes and their organizations, as well key social institutions, such as government, political parties, and organized religion, in countries during the period of industrialization and modernization. Thus, for example, in countries where industrial and commercial middle class elements were able to diffuse the influence of conservative landed elites and consolidate their own political and economic power during the period of industrialization, they were able to impose national policies favourable to their economic interests in limited government involvement in economic and social affairs, and reliance on markets and private initiative in addressing the social problems resulting from industrialization. The consequence was the emergence of a “Liberal pattern” of civil society development, characterized by a

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fairly substantial TS institutions, but, mostly dependent on private charity for their support. In Europe, this pattern is most visible in the United Kingdom and Switzerland.

In countries where industrialization and the partial liberalization of social relations led to the substantial growth of a working class and of organizations representing its interests, but not to the point of displacing the dominant position of landed and/or industrial or commercial elites, a decidedly different pattern emerged characterized by greater state-sponsored social welfare protections—but channelled through politically “safe,” religiously affiliated, private voluntary organizations. Such solution was favoured by the Catholic Church, which developed the doctrine of subsidiarity, holding that social issues ought to be addressed by the social unit closest to the family, including, the parish and Church-affiliated social welfare associations. This produced a “Welfare Partnership Pattern” of civil society sector development, mostly focused on service activities instead of protest and advocacy, heavily subsidized by the state, but safely held in check by conservative religious or other institutions. This pattern was most pronounced in the North-Western Europe countries, especially in Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, where the Catholic Church was relatively powerful, but subsequently adopted by other countries now making up the EU.

Yet another pattern emerged where the power of both urban and rural elites had been weakened, and where working class elements combined with urban professionals were able to exert substantial influence on emerging social welfare provision. The upshot here was a social-democratic pattern where social welfare services are treated as a “right” of all citizens—not a gift bestowed by charitable institutions—and are delivered directly by governmental institutions subject to popular control by citizens. In Europe, this pattern emerged in the Scandinavian countries and Austria.

Another constellation of social class and social actor power arises where pre-modern landed elements retain power into the modern era and prolong economic stagnation that threatens the country’s sovereignty. To counteract this threat, military leaders, senior civil servants, urban professionals, or modernizing elites stage a revolutionary takeover of state institutions in order to push through programs of rapid industrialization and modernization. To keep popular forces at bay and make it possible to channel whatever surplus is produced into modernization rather than consumption, such modernizing elites often find it necessary to limit personal freedoms and particularly restrict the growth of civil society organizations that could challenge governmental dominance and disrupt the rapid modernization agenda through demands for greater political voice and better living standards. This results in a “Statist Pattern” of third sector development characterized by
a fairly small scale of civic institutions operating in a narrow range of fields deemed critical for national development. One consequence of this constraint on the TS organizational development is a shifting of the voluntary self-help activities from the organizational to the informal social sphere. In Europe, this pattern first emerged in Russia, Turkey, Spain and Portugal, but after the World War II was forcibly exported to Central and Eastern Europe countries on the bayonets of the Red Army.

This social origins theory thus does a better job of explaining the regional variations in the TS dimensions in Europe than do the alternative theories. First it explains why the size of the organizational component of the TS in Eastern European countries is markedly smaller than that elsewhere in Europe, while the size of direct voluntary action is markedly larger (Fig. 7). Until the 1990s, the Central and Eastern European countries remained tied to the statist pattern under which the organizational component of the TS remained firmly in strict state control. As the legitimacy of the political regime waned, so did the legitimacy of these state controlled civic organizations. As a consequence, virtually all spontaneous civic activities were conducted in the informal sphere of neighbourly self-help activities and unorganized social movements. Although the economic and political reforms of the 1990s and the subsequent EU accession dramatically changed the environment in which civic organizations operate, the norms of social behaviour that favour direct volunteer action over participation in organized civic action still linger.

A similar process took place in the Mediterranean countries, many of which fell under the statist regime during modernization. However, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, the statist regimes in the Mediterranean countries were democratized much earlier, in 1945 in Italy and in the early 1970s in Spain and Portugal. Also these countries joined the EU much earlier than their Eastern European counterparts. Consequently, they enjoyed the benefits of a supportive environment for civic organizational development for a considerably longer period than the CEE countries.

The social origins theory also helps us understand the otherwise puzzling dominance of expressive over service activities in the third sector of the Scandinavian countries (Fig. 8). Since these countries share many similarities with other European countries, this difference cannot be easily explained by the supposed peculiarities of the Scandinavian culture or Scandinavian consumer preferences. The social origins theory accounts for this difference by postulating two different patterns of civil society development in these parts of Europe. The North-Western parts of Europe developed the welfare partnership pattern in which private, often religiously affiliated organizations, are junior partners of
governments in delivering public welfare services, but the strong position of the working class and rural elements in the Scandinavian countries led to a social democratic regime in which public welfare services were delivered predominantly by the state. Relieved of this service burden, TS organizations could focus their efforts on expressive activities, such as sports, culture, or civic activism.

The social origins theory also explains why the government share of nonprofit revenue is considerably higher in Northern Europe than elsewhere in Europe (Fig. 9). North-Western Europe, especially Germany and the Netherlands, pioneered the policies of harnessing civic organizations into the provision of publicly funded services. Although the original impulses behind these policies were to counteract the radicalization of the working class, they proved to be a very effective mechanism of public service delivery that combines the security of public funding with the responsiveness of relatively small and non-bureaucratic civic organizations. As a result, the welfare partnership pattern continued to develop even after the original motivation behind it lost its relevance.

To summarize, the social origins theory of third sector development thus carries us considerably far down the road toward explaining the diverse size, shape, functions, and support structure of the TS in Europe, and does so considerably better than the alternative explanations that have been deployed up to now. What the analysis here shows is that while the TS may be a conduit for altruistic sentiments and personal preferences, the size of the sector and the shape that it takes depend heavily on the broader structures of power relationships in society. Restoring considerations of power to the centre of analysis of the third sector thus emerges as a central imperative if we are to understand the path that civil society development takes.

This analysis also suggests a significant connection between the growth of the TS and the strength of labour movements and their political extensions. This connection is often missed in public perception, as “civil society” and “organized labour” are often seen as two separate social institutions pursuing wholly disparate, if not mutually antagonistic, goals. But the contribution of the labour movement to the development of the civil society sector is significant and takes two different forms. In the first place, organized labour has created a wide array of self-help groups and clubs serving the needs of the working class. And second, organized labour’s demands have often leveraged government policies that create favourable conditions for general civil society sector growth.

The social origins theory cannot only explain existing developments, but also help
forecast the future. This can offer valuable insights into possible outcomes in rapidly changing parts of the world. And it can offer useful insights for the design of public policies facilitative of robust third sector development. But for these topics, it is necessary to turn to subsequent portions of this report.

3 Conclusion

The following five conclusions thus emerge from this initial overview of the size and contours of the Third Sector in EU member countries:

1. In the first place, it is possible to formulate a coherent, systematic, and operational cross-national definition of this sector that can be utilized to assemble empirical description of this sector.

2. Despite limitations in the available data systems, it is possible to compile a cross-nationally comparable quantitative data on the basic dimensions of the Third Sector.

3. An initial effort to generate such data reveals a Third sector that is far more widely dispersed and far larger than commonly recognized, ranking as one of the largest employers and contributors to economic life of all major industries, and providing as well vehicles for the expression of a host of values and interests that add enormously to the quality of national life.

4. Although this sector is quite widespread and extensive in the aggregate, it also exhibits enormous variations from country to country. These variations go well beyond the simple dimensions of size and economic impact and encompass functions these institutions perform, and how they support themselves.

5. These cross-national variations in the contours of the Third Sector can be explained by different patterns of historical development in Europe; three such patterns are especially visible; the welfare partnership pattern prevailing in Western Europe, in which Third Sector institutions served as instruments of delivering public welfare services, the social democratic pattern prevailing in the Scandinavian countries, in which the state assumed the delivery of most public welfare services while Third Sector performed mainly expressive functions, and the statist pattern prevailing in Eastern European countries, where the Third Sector faced institutional obstacles to development under the Soviet system.
Appendix 1: Methodology for estimating the size of the TS in Europe

Following the conceptual framework developed by the TSI project, the third sector consists of the following institutional components: nonprofit institutions, cooperatives, social enterprises, and individual human activities outside organizations. According to this conceptual framework, all nonprofit institutions are in the third sector scope, however only some cooperatives and social enterprises the third sector's definitional features. This framework also defines the individual activities in scope as those that provide unpaid work performed for public benefit rather than that of the volunteers’ households or families. The methodology used in this project to estimate the size of the third sector's estimates each of these components separately and then adds those estimates together to arrive at the estimate of the full time equivalent employment in the entire third sector size.

1. Nonprofit Institutions (NPIs)

The existing data sources on the employment in NPIs include the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Megan Haddock, Social Origins of Civil Society: A Comparative Historical Approach, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, forthcoming) and NPI Satellite Accounts compiled by national statistical agencies. These two data sources cover 18 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) and Norway. The data reported in these sources were “updated” to 2014 by calculating the ratios of NPI employment to total employment for the year for which the data have been originally reported, and then applying these ratios to the 2014 employment in respective countries (as reported by the Eurostat). This methodology assumes that the NPI share of the total employment remains more or less constant over time. Inasmuch as this share grows over time, this methodology slightly underestimates the actual size of NPI employment.

For the remaining 10 EU countries on which no NPI data are available, a regression based estimation methodology was used. This methodology uses the multivariate linear regression model to estimate the NPI share of total employment in 18 countries on which the NPI data are already available, and then applying the regression equation to countries on which no NPI data exist. Several predictor variables were tested, and the following were selected based on the amount of explained variance: per Capita GDP in USD,
services share of GVA, and NPISH share of GDP. This model explains 71.5% of variance (66% adjusted). For countries on which NPISH data were not available, the missing data were replaced averages for Eastern and Western Europe accordingly.

The regression equation was used to predict NPI share of total employment in 10 countries where the NPI data are not available. The following adjustments to the predicted NPI share values in those 10 countries were made to restrict its variability to the actually observed range:

For countries where the predicted value of the NPI share is lower than the lowest observed value in the 18 country data set, the lowest observed value (for Romania) was used;

For countries where the predicted value was higher than the highest observed value in the 18 country data set, the highest observed value (for the were used for upper and lower boundaries.

Since this estimation methodology results in a reasonably accurate prediction of NPI employment in the 10 countries as a group, but predictions for individual countries may be less accurate and should be viewed with caution. These 10 countries as a group account for only about 5 per cent of NPI workforce (paid and volunteers) covered by this study.  

2. Cooperatives and mutual societies

The data on cooperatives and mutual come from José Luis Monzón Campos and Rafael Chaves Ávila, The Social Economy in the European Union, Report drawn up for the European Economic and Social Committee by the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC), 2011, except for Poland where more accurate estimates were provided by the local partner. The report provides employment data in all EU member countries the following separately identified types of organizations: cooperatives, mutual, and associations. Since Norway is not an EU member country, the data for this country are not included in this publication. However, the TSI project research team has determined that all cooperatives and mutuals that are

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17 Data for predictor variables come from the national accounts aggregates available at the UNSD website http://data.un.org/Explorer.aspx?d=SNAAMA
in TSI scope are already included in the NPI Satellite Account released by Statistics Norway, and those not covered by the NPISA are likely to be out of scope.

The TSI research team has also determined that most mutual societies are also out the TS scope. As a consequence, employment in this type of institutions has not been included in the estimates of the sized of the TS, except in France where a small number of such societies were included. It was furthermore assumed that associations are likely to be NPIs and thus already covered in the estimates of NPI employment. Consequently, the figures reported for these institutions by Monzón and Chaves were not included to avoid double counting.

Finally, the TSI conceptual framework stipulates than not all cooperatives meet the TS defining criteria, and some of them are out of scope. At this time, the TSI research team has no way of determining what share of employment in cooperatives is in the TS scope. It was therefore assumed that on average, 50 per cent of that employment is in scope. This assumption will be revised as more information becomes available.

In sum, the tentative estimation of the FTE employment in this component of the TSI is half of the employment in cooperatives, as reported by Monzón and Chaves.

3. Social enterprises

No data on social enterprises are available at this time. However, the TSI project review suggests that most of these institutional units are already included in the NPI or the cooperative component, so the remaining social enterprises that are in the TS scope would likely add very little to the total.

4. Direct volunteering

The data on direct volunteering come from estimates based on national time use surveys and reported by OECD. TUS assigns time respondents spend on various activities during the 24-hour period and extrapolates those values to the entire population. This allows estimation of the total time spend on these activities by the entire adult population of a country during the period of one year, and converting that time to FTE employment, assuming 1,760 hours per a FT job. That number may actually vary from country to

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country. Time spent care for non-household members reported in TUS tabulations was used as a proxy for direct volunteering. This probably underestimates direct volunteering that does not involve helping other households, such as unorganized community work or protest actions.

Eighteen European countries are covered by the TUS data in the OECD report. The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. However, for Poland an alternative data source (GUS, *Volunteering Through Organizations And Other Types Of Unpaid Work Outside Own Household – 2011, Warsaw, 2012*) was used that offers a more accurate estimate based on the ILO methodology outlined in the *Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work*. The value reported in the latter source is about 5 per cent lower than that estimated from the TUS data for that country. For the remaining 11 countries covered by this report, the averages calculated separately for Western and Eastern Europe were used.

The estimation methodology used the average number of minutes per adult spend on caring for non-household members and volunteering reported in TUS and multiplied that number by 365 days and by the size of adult population (15-65 years of age) in a respective country to estimate the total number of hours spend on these activities during one year. That number was then converted to FTE by dividing it by 1,760 hours.

5. **Estimation of the TS size**

Employment in each of the institutional component described above (1 through 4) was summed for each of the 28 countries covered by this report to arrive at the total size of workforce (paid and volunteers) in the TS. The values presented here are conservative estimates of that size due to limited ability to estimate social enterprises and the accurate value of employment in cooperatives.

6. **Estimation of service and expressive shares of the workforce.**

The core data for this estimation were collected the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project for 20 European countries. Unweighted country averages of these shares were calculated to estimate the respective shares of the NPI component in the EU as a whole. This estimate was used as the basis for the figures for the entire Third Sector by factoring in the workforce of the cooperatives and direct volunteering, which was treated as performing mainly service function. Although it is possible that some direct volunteering was also performing the expressive function, this kind of direct
volunteering was not captured by the TUS data that asked only for helping other households, which is service by definition. This method probably underestimates the expressive share of the TS workforce.

7. Estimation of TS revenue shares.

The core data for this estimation, representing percentage shares of government payments (grants, contracts, and reimbursements), fees (market sales, membership dues, and investments), and private philanthropy in NPI revenues were collected by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project for 20 European countries. Unweighted country averages of these shares were calculated to estimate the respective shares of the NPI component in the EU as a whole. In the European context, government reimbursements for individual services account for most of government support to NPIs, therefore the share of government support reported here is significantly larger than that reported in conventional economic statistics that treat such reimbursements as market sales indistinguishable from types of market sales.

This estimate was used as the basis for the figures for the entire Third Sector by factoring in the estimated share of cooperative revenue, which is assumed to come mainly from fee income (market sales and investment). The cooperative share of fee revenue was included in proportion to cooperative share of TS employment on the underlying assumption that employee compensation is funded by government payments, fees, and philanthropy in the same proportion as the shares of these three revenue streams. The value of direct volunteering, estimated at the replacement cost, was counted as private philanthropy and factored in proportionally to the direct volunteering share of the TS workforce.
### Appendix 2 Table. Estimates of TS FTE workforce in EU and Norway, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Paid (FTE)</th>
<th>NPIs</th>
<th>Volunteers (FTE)</th>
<th>of which coops</th>
<th>of which NPIs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>160.545</td>
<td>5.580</td>
<td>233.961</td>
<td>8.132</td>
<td>394.506</td>
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<td>129.639</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>581.590</td>
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<td>1.535.368</td>
<td>38.632</td>
<td>680.000</td>
<td>17.110</td>
<td>2.215.368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.397.618</td>
<td>74.723</td>
<td>1.307.580</td>
<td>40.752</td>
<td>3.705.199</td>
</tr>
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<td>181.885</td>
<td>3.900</td>
<td>48.794</td>
<td>1.040</td>
<td>230.679</td>
</tr>
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<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>22.657</td>
<td>174</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>40.727</td>
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<td>488.632</td>
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<td>21.240</td>
<td>1.422.360</td>
<td>18.070</td>
<td>3.094.226</td>
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<td>456</td>
<td>18.615</td>
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<td>1.075</td>
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<td>597.390</td>
<td>64.668</td>
<td>1.535.525</td>
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<td>18.923</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>137.358</td>
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<td>8.469</td>
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<tr>
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<td>29.412</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>99.934</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.236</td>
<td>26.413</td>
<td>1.357</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>887</td>
<td>8.614</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>29.266</td>
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<td>16.992</td>
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<td>17.924</td>
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<td>405.955</td>
<td>6.593.090</td>
<td>263.734</td>
<td>17.122.423</td>
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* Excluding coops and mutuals that are NPIs